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IMPERATIVE OF NATIONAL SAVINGS: A CASE FOR ADOPTION OF
APPROPRIATE BENCHMARK PRICE FOR CRUDE OIL
BY
1
MOSES F. OTU
Fluctuations in revenue invalidate
most of the basic assumptions and
projections usually made to facilitate
the budgeting processes. This
subsequently, creates challenges for
policy makers, analysts and
facilitators.
MOSES F. OTU

INTRODUCTION
Budgeting involves the design of
plans that aligns expected financial
resources and expenditure to
accomplish specific national goals
and objectives. It is usually time
bound and ensures judicious use of
resources for sustainable growth if the
basic principles and discipline are
adhered to. Nigeria's annual budget
estimates are closely associated with
the anticipated oil revenue flows
dictated by oil prices and production
targets as predetermined by
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).
One of the naughty problems faced by
developing oil economy like Nigeria is
fluctuations of the nation's revenue
resulting from volatile crude oil prices
in international market.
Consequently, sharp declines in oil
revenue are not uncommon and it
affects smooth implementation of the
budget. The oil sub-sector
contribution to the gross domestic
product (GDP) is very significant in
Nigeria (about 26.0 percent), as such
a shock in international price of crude
oil would adversely affect total
revenue,(Nnanna and Masha,2003).

Recently in Nigeria, a benchmark
price for crude oil was adopted for the
purpose of estimating oil revenue to
mitigate the unnecessary disruptions
of the annual budgetary processes
and stabilize the revenue. This
strategy was initially experimented for
the appropriation bill of 2002 and
internalized in the subsequent years.
The strategy of adopting benchmark
price for crude oil below the market
price presupposes that there was a
consensus for compulsory national
savings to build up a pool of funds
which would cushion the effect of
shocks that could result from
unfavorable developments in the
future as well as ensuring high quality
spending.
However, method of arriving at the
benchmark price for crude oil for the
budget has been criticized as being
highly subjective and lacking in
transparency as it was not based on
any acceptable and predetermined
principle. This has often resulted in
heated debates and intensive
negotiations between the executives
and the legislative arm of government
which often results in delayed release
of the appropriation bill and the
attendant adverse impact on the
economy.
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It is the objective of this paper
therefore to develop a simple
framework for deriving an acceptable
bench mark price for crude oil for
budgeting purposes. It is hoped that
this would remove subjectivity in
budgeting process and promote
understanding between all the
stakeholders in order to fast track the
process of passage of the
appropriation bill. Following this brief
introduction, the next segment of the
paper examines the need for national
saving fund and constitutional
provisions for national savings, while
section three focuses on the
international experiences. Section
four presents the framework for
deriving appropriate benchmark price
for the national budget and the last
section concludes the article.
2.0 The Need for National Savings
Fund and Constitutional
Provisions:
2.1 Stylized Facts on Savings
Behavior:
The subject of savings has attracted
many empirical research works and
comments in contemporary economic
literature since the Keynesian era. In
line with the presentation of Keynes
most of the economic literature
agreed that there are many varied
reasons why people save. Keynes
(1936) produced the following
celebrated list.
Precaution: To build up a reserve
against unforeseen contingencies;
Foresight: To provide for an
anticipated future relation between
income and the needs of the individual
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or family different from that which
exists in the present;
Calculation: To enjoy interest and
appreciation;
Improvement: To enjoy gradually
increasing expenditure;
Independence: To enjoy a sense of
independence and a power to do
things;
Enterprise: To secure a masse de
manoeuvre to carry out speculative or
business projects;
Pride: To bequeath a fortune;
Avarice: To satisfy pure miserliness,
i.e. unreasonable but insistent
inhibitions against acts of expenditure
as such.
Corresponding to these reasons for
saving, Keynes provided a list of
motives for consumption: Enjoyment,
Shortsightedness, Generosity,
Miscalculation, Ostentation, and
Extravagance. From the above, it is
clear that there are many reasons why
an individual might save; and many
reasons he or she might not. Similarly,
for a nation as an entity, numerous
factors come to bear on their savings
behavior, such as political and social
considerations. For instance, in
Nigeria, several efforts had been
made to establish national savings
funds in the past, which were
however, short lived with limited
impact on the economy. A brief
highlights on Nigeria's attempts to
institutionalize national savings is
given in the next section.
2.2
Nigeria's Experience in
National Savings
Attempt at institutionalizing national
savings crystallized in the
establishment of stabilization fund in
1990s where proceeds of excess
budgeted revenue were kept. The
main objectives of the fund were to
provide buffer financial resources to
the budgeted revenue in the case that
the oil prices fall below a specified
level, and in addition, the scheme was
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meant to support and sustain long
term growth initiatives and
investments in the economy. Other
efforts at establishing saving fund
include the proposed national savings
certificate. In the same mould as the
stabilization fund, the proposed
national saving certificate has
remained on the drawing board till
date. Currently, Nigeria is operating
excess crude account, a semblance
of the defunct stabilization fund with a
new name.
Stabilization fund was initiated during
the military era without the
appropriate enabling laws, and
therefore, the design of the scheme
lacked key success features that
could have sustained the scheme,
such as a clear policy on
determination of the appropriate
benchmark price for the budget, and
policy on withdrawal from the fund.
Moreover, the schemes were
established to address exigencies
and meet urgent national concerns
after which the zeal to continue waned
as the situation normalized. The
operations of the funds were
therefore, perceived to encourage
corruption and fiscal indiscipline and
thus their operations were
suspended. Furthermore, it appears
that establishment of national savings
contradicts the provisions of the 1999
Nigerian constitution. Section 162 of
the constitution stipulates that all
revenues collected by the
Government of the Federation shall
be paid into the Federation Account,
and shared to the federating units,
except the independent revenue of
the Federal Government. Probably,
the constitutional stance worked
against the actualization of national
savings which the Fiscal
Responsibility Act would be expected
to address.
2.3 The Need for Sustainable
Source of Funds In Nigeria:
33

Given the Nigerian government's
ambitious growth targets, and the
need in the present global
environment to generate investable
resources internally, the desire to
establish sustainable pool of funds
becomes paramount. It therefore,
follows that contemporary policy
designs and research agenda
directed at enhancing saving should
occupy the front burner in the scheme
of priorities.
A saving fund is designed to create a
store of wealth for future generations
by converting a deplorable revenue
stream into a perpetual income flow
(Devlin and Titman, 2004). Nigeria as
a political entity needs such income
flows for more than one reason,
perhaps the following may suffice:
Recently, Nigeria went through horrific
experience in external debt
management; ranging from debt
rescheduling; to debt repayment, and
eventually securing debt forgiveness.
It should be underscored that during
the heydays of external debt burden,
the political machineries as well as the
treasury was fully stretched by
accepting to pay a proportion of the
total indebtedness which was a
staggering lump sum to the foreign
creditors, before the debt relief was
secured. Following this bitter
experience, the appetite to acquire
foreign loans and advances as a
nation in the nearest future would be
dampened, as
any move in this
direction to secure foreign loans
would be vehemently resisted by the
citizenry, as well as the national
assembly and the labour union. This
implies that there must be a well
structured mechanism to generate
fund internally; to cushion the effect of
shocks in the system, to enjoy
sustained increase in expenditure as
well as a sense of independence and
empowerment to create wealth.
Savings funds would serve simply as

Volume 30 No. 1

a place to bank excess crude oil
revenues until they can be efficiently
invested. Since our revenues are
largely generated from a commodity
with a very volatile price,
implementing an investment plan that
increases slowly and smoothly
overtime becomes much more
challenging. An important role of
savings funds is to allow the country to
smoothen out investment
expenditures and this increases the
efficiency of investment by minimizing
cost adjustments. Fiscal surpluses
tend to be more inefficient and create
more distortions that are also more
vulnerable to political economy
pressures evidenced by the wasting
of the revenue windfall realized from
crude oil sales during “Operation
Desert Storm” the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait.
2.3 Constitutional Efforts at
Establishing National Savings:
The quest for a sustained funding of
the national budget was reechoed in
the National Assembly and
crystallized into the drafting of the
Fiscal Responsibility Bill. The bill
proposed a shift from annual
budgeting to a medium term
expenditure framework (MTEF) of
three financial years. MTEF is a
rolling process repeated every year
and aims at reducing the imbalance
between what is demanded by
ministries, departments and
agencies.
The proposed Fiscal Responsibility
Bill advocates for development of a
macroeconomic framework for the
economy which makes adequate
provisions for national savings. It was
entrenched in the Bill that the
underlying assumptions as well as
evaluation and analysis of the macro
economy should be clearly stated.
Furthermore, it was spelt out that
where the reference commodity price
rises above the predetermined level,
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the excess funds derivable should be
saved in the Central Bank on behalf of
all the federating units. An extension
of this provisions barred access to the
funds unless the price of the reference
commodity falls below the bench mark
level for a period of three consecutive
months, and places the authority to
release the fund on the national
assembly.

that the funds have a dampening
effect on government spending as a
percentage of the GDP. In the same
study, they maintained that the funds
appear to raise fixed capital
investment as a share of GDP by
nearly three percentage points and
that there is a positive relation
between the balances held in the fund
and fixed capital investment.

Considering the deteriorating
infrastructure, poor welfare facilities
and other social indicators, the
question that readily comes to mind is,
do we really need to save for the future
in the face of these decaying lots? We
are aware that individuals as well as
economic units have optimum
absorptive capacity, a situation where
there is too much money in the
economy chasing few goods and
services results in inflation pressure.
Secondly, it has been established that
too much resources in the hands of
government promotes recklessness
as most of the funds would be
diverted, embezzled and at best spent
on white elephant projects, which
usually are abandoned when the
sources of funding receded. The cost
of completion of such projects on
resumption normally escalates due to
inflationary factors resulting from cost
overrun.

In his study of commodity stabilization
funds, Fiess (2002) reported a
favourable outcome in Chile, Norway
and Oman. They indicated that the
fund moderated significant volatility in
government spending and delivered
higher shares of gross fixed capital
investment. Based on their result,
they concluded that country specific
circumstances matter a lot, in
particular the use of fiscal rules and
targets to guide spending decisions
over a longer time horizon.

3.0 International Experiences
Saving funds has been practiced in
many economies with different
variance and at different terms as
dictated my economic environment.
The pioneers in this field are Alaska,
Alberta and Papua New Guinea in the
1960's and 1970's. Other countries
that came into the scene in early
1990's are Algeria, Ecuador, Iran,
Norway and Venezuela. In an attempt
to ascertain the effectiveness of
saving funds, Davis and others
(2001), using a pooled crosssectional and time series data for 71
countries for 1970 2000, suggests
34

Norway's success story could be
linked to strong mechanisms that
break the cord between oil price
behaviour and fiscal expenditure,
generally in a form of fiscal rule. The
saving fund is treated as central
governments net cash flow and
transferred to the treasury to finance
the non oil deficit. Linking the fund
accumulation to fiscal surpluses
would help to avoid the problem of an
overall deterioration in the
government's net asset position. In
the case of Chile, withdrawals from
the fund are subject to the fiscal rule
with the structured balance calculated
by factoring out the cyclical
component of the copper price and
other cyclical factors (Fiess, 2002). In
both cases, transfers to and from the
fund require parliamentary approval.
Concerning the optimal size of funds
to be accumulated, results of studies
conducted in this area appear to be
inconclusive. However, Crain and
Devlin (2002), indicated that larger

Volume 30 No. 1

funds created management problem
especially if the design of saving funds
is not transparent. In addition, they
maintained that political pressure on
the government usually results in
mismanagement of the funds and
recommended that there must be an
inbuilt mechanism for control
reporting and evaluation of fund
resources and operations. In his
contribution on the management of
the funds, Heilbrum (2002), stressed
that the funds should be
professionally managed with
oversight by the Ministry of Finance or
Central Bank. Cited the example of
Norway, he indicated that the Ministry
of Finance supervises the activities of
the fund and sets guidelines or
investments and reporting
requirements.
Economic literature seems to be silent
about the appropriate formula applied
to determine the level of savings
required. However, most studies
mentioned in the passing the basis for
deriving funds for national savings
funds accumulation of excess above
a target price as in the case of Chile's
Copper Stabilization Fund; revenue
contingent a set percentage of
commodity revenues, as in the case of
the Alaska's Permanent Fund; and a
mixture of both, a set percentage of
commodity revenue and a reference
price as in the case of Venezuela's
Stabilization Fund, are very common
in the literature.
This study adopts price contingent to
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derive a scheme for benchmarking
crude oil prices for the annual
budgeting process and indirectly
building up a pool of national savings
funds. This would reduce the rancor
that follows the annual ritual of fixing
routinely this all important benchmark
price.
4.0
Factors that Determines
International Oil Prices and Trends
of Spot Price:
4.1 Determinants of International
Oil Prices
Temporary and permanent factors
have been identified to influence
crude oil prices in the international
market. Oil prices fluctuate
unpredictably because of temporary
changes in global economic and
political conditions that affect the
supply and demand for oil. For
instance, political crises in Nigeria,
Iran, or Iraq could lead to temporary
disruption of oil supplies, and cause
prices to rise. In an attempt to
stabilize prices, OPEC would direct
their members to step up production
quota in order to make up for the
shortfall depending on the magnitude
of the crises and the quantity of
production involved in the trouble
spot. Prices subsequently fall again
as the problem is resolved. Similarly
economic recession could lead to oil
glut, a situation of over production
resulting in a temporary oversupply
that generates price declines.
Permanent factors that influence oil
price movement are development that
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culminated in sustained increase in
demand or supply of crude oil in the
market. Permanent changes can arise
because of longer-lasting changes in
demand arising from emergence of
substitutes for fuel or stronger
incentives for conservation of energy
leading to less consumption of fuel.
Other situations that could lead to
sustained increased demand include
technological changes and new
discoveries that increase the supply of
oil (Devlin & Titman, 2004).
In
summary, crude oil prices depend on
the interplay of demand and supply as
dictated by global politics, intricacies
and perhaps technological advances
and sometimes weather changes.
4.2 Trends in Oil Prices
Prices of crude oil fluctuate sometime
with wide swings. For instance, the
price of crude oil was as low as $10.0
per barrel in February 1997, however,
at end-December, the same year, the
price increased to $26.0 per barrel
(Table 1).
The low price was traceable to
economic recession in the Asian
economy which resulted in
suppression of demand for oil in the
first of the year. While the extreme
cold weather condition during the third
and the forth quarters of the year
increased demand for heating oil and
thus the price of crude oil increased
sharply.
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Chart 1
Annual Average Spot Price of Crude Oil

Price (US$)
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0.00
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year

On average, the price of crude oil was fairly stable at $17.96, $13.08
and $17.96 in 1997, 1998 and 1999, respectively.

Table 1

SPOT PRICE OF CRUDE PETROLEUM 1997-2005 (US$)
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

January
11.35
15.29 11.35
25.62 25.09
February
10.22 14.14 10.22 28.06 27.53
March
12.53 13.10 12.53 27.97 24.57
April
15.47 13.63 15.47 23.05 25.74
May
15.24 14.56 15.24
27.9 28.45
June
15.99 12.93 15.99 29.78 28.03
July
18.57 12.35 18.57 28.52 24.89
August
20.73 12.24 20.73 29.48 25.94
September
22.48
13.4 22.48 33.15 25.93
October
22.36 12.77 22.36 30.81 20.51
November
24.76 12.15 24.76 32.63 18.99
December
25.81
10.4 25.81 25.95 18.65
Average
17.96 13.08 17.96 28.58 24.53
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin and Reuters

19.64

31.86

31.77

44.83

20.26

32.9

30.99

45.69

23.54

31.09

34.13

53.42

25.78

29.54

34.40

51.90

25.26

26.1

38.32

49.11

24.01

27.94

35.55

54.99

25.92

28.52

38.42

58.54

26.9

30.05

43.53

66.42

28.38

27.49

43.71

65.32

27.97

30.01

50.39

60.43

24.5

29

42.8

56.74

28.38

29.85

40.7

57.76

Months

1997

1998

Similarly, in 2000, the average price
increased to $28.55 per barrel from
$17.96 in 1999, and edged upwards
gradually to $25.05 and $29.53 in
2002 and 2003, respectively. The
price of crude oil once again bounced
back to $38.73 and $55.43 in 2004
and 2005 in the respective years. The
recent increase in price of crude is
attributable to increase in demand
resulting from shortages precipitated
by disruption of production in OPEC

1999

2000

25.05 29.53 38.73 55.43

member states and in the Russian
Federation.
4.0
Derivation of Appropriate
Benchmark Price for Crude Oil
The process of arriving at acceptable
price for crude oil is a contentious
issue shrouded by political intrigue
and interest. Several countries such
as Chile and Russia have engaged in
prolonged discussions and disputes
over methods of determining
36

appropriate benchmark price. In this
study, a simple descriptive scheme
which makes use of historical trends
of prices of crude and the prevailing
economic situation to arrive at the
benchmark price. The strength of this
approach is that inflationary factor can
easily be built into the system as
against the outdated incremental
budgeting. The framework of the
derivation is presented in the following
equations.
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( x i .......x N )
* SF .......... (1)
N

Xmin = Lowest crude price in the same
period

(x max...... x min )
* SF......(2)
2

SF = Saving factor whose value lies
between zero and one.

Where
Xi = Spot price of crude oil at month
one,
XN = Spot price of crude oil at endDecember,
N = No of months,
Xmax = Highest crude price obtainable
in the period, and

This method assumes favourable
price of crude oil in the international
market and that the annual average
crude oil price remains above the
predetermined benchmark.
4.1 Saving Factor
The choice of saving factor depends
on the fiscal stance and the level of
savings desired by the nation.

However, the drivers of the
international price of crude could be a
very reliable reference point for the
choice of saving factor. For instance,
if the global random process that
determines the oil price in the
preceding year is perceived to be
temporary, it is a signal that the prices
of oil may probably remain higher.
The present value of future revenues
is not very sensitive to changes in spot
prices. A close watch of global
dynamics would enhance fixing an
appropriate level of the saving factor
for a fiscal year.

Table 2
2005
44.83
66.42
55.63
0.60
33.38
0.65
36.16

Price
Lowest
Highest
Average
S/Factor 1
Result 1
S/Factor 2
Result 2

2004
30.99
50.39
40.69
0.60
24.41
0.65
26.45

2003
26.10
31.86
28.98
0.60
17.39
0.65
18.84

2002
19.64
28.38
24.01
0.60
14.41
0.65
15.61

2001
18.65
28.45
23.55
0.60
14.13
0.65
15.31

2000
23.05
33.15
28.10
0.60
16.86
0.65
18.27

Note: S/Factor = Sacrificial Factor i.e the present benefit foregone for future
gains

Table 3
Price
Average
Price
S/Factor 1
Result 3
S/Factor 2
Result 4

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

55.43
0.60
33.26
0.65
36.03

38.73
0.60
23.24
0.65
25.17

29.53
0.60
17.72
0.65
19.19

25.05
0.60
15.03
0.65
16.28

24.53
0.60
14.72
0.65
15.94

28.58
0.60
17.15
0.65
18.58

Chart 2:
Bench mark scenario of crude oil price(2000- 2005)
Price (US$)

50
40
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4
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Application of the Derived Formula
Application of the derived formula to
the spot prices of crude oil from 20002005, is presented in tables 2 and 3.
Results show that in 2000 using
equation 1 and assuming that a
saving factor of 65 percent was
adopted the benchmark price for the
budget should have been $16.86 per
barrel, while the $14.13 and $14.41
per barrel for 2001 and 2002
respectively. In 2005 benchmark
should be $33.38 per barrel in same
scenario. However, a saving factor of
65 percent results in $36.16 per barrel
in 2005 compare to the $35.0 which
was eventually adopted for the 2005
a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l . S i m i l a r l y,
application of formula two (Table3)
indicates a benchmark price of $36.03
per barrel.
Comparing results (1-4), show that
the result of each scenario (Saving
Factor, 60,65 %) are similar with no
significant difference. For instance, in
2005, the benchmark price using
formula one is $33.38, while formula
two gives $33.28 per barrel. This
implies that any of the two formula
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could be used for the purpose of
deriving appropriate benchmark price
of crude oil for budgeting. However,
formula one which incorporates the
annual average price is more
appealing in that a sharp increase in
price in one period could result in a
higher average price between the
maximum and the minimum price
implicit in equation one.
Notwithstanding the bottom-line is
adoption of a consistent framework
which would reduce time wasting and
rancor in the budgeting process.
Recommendations:
Attempt has been made to present a
scheme for deriving a benchmark for
crude oil price for the appropriation
bill. It is envisaged that this approach
will facilitate budgeting process and
enthroned transparency. This
strategy will lead to creation of a pool
of funds that can absorb shock arising
from unfavourable development in the
international crude oil market.
Adoption of this scheme will reduce
wasteful spending and instill fiscal
discipline as well as smoothening
government revenue.
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It is evident that previous efforts at
institutionalizing national savings
were not very successful because
they were not backed by the enabling
laws. It is apparent that constitutional
provision does not favour national
savings as such efforts should be
made to address this issue. Probably,
the passage of the Fiscal
Responsibilities Act would address
this and add value to this strategy as
well as accelerate its implementation.
Concluding Remarks:
The nation has passed through bitter
experience in the management and
servicing of its external debt burden, it
is about time we internalized national
savings as a culture. The current
favourable crude oil price could be a
good starting point to build up national
savings by setting aside a portion of
our proceeds from oil sales. However,
the method adopted to arrive at
appropriate savings formula, has to be
transparent and credible to earn
acceptability by all the stakeholders.
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